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Assisting a suicide: Potential succession law 
consequences 
Tina Cockburn and Barbara Hamilton 
The recent criminal law decisions where people have been convicted of aiding suicide raise important 
legal and ethical issues in relation to whether euthanasia should be legalised. These cases also raise 
issues of great significance for succession lawyers. Where, as in cases such as Nielsen and Justins, 
the person convicted of aiding a suicide is a principal beneficiary under the will of the deceased, 
various legal consequences, such as: forfeiture of the interest under the will; liability for breach of 
fiduciary obligation; and/or a finding of undue influence, may follow which may result in loss of such 
benefit. There are still some unanswered questions. Firstly, will the common law forfeiture rule be 
applied to a person convicted of aiding suicide as distinct from manslaughter? Secondly, if there is a 
forfeiture, is the wrongdoer obliged to hold his or her forfeited interest on a constructive trust or to 
be treated as having predeceased the testator? Finally, should there be legislative reform of the 
forfeiture rule along the lines adopted in NSW and the ACT to modify the effect of the forfeiture rule 
where the court is satisfied that justice requires the rule to be modified, or would a better model for 
reform be the proposed NZ codified forfeiture legislation? 
 
The recent criminal conviction1 of Queensland teacher Merin Nielsen for aiding the suicide of an 
elderly acquaintance, Frank Ward, raises some timely issues, particularly for succession lawyers. This 
is the second time in recent years that there has been a conviction of a person who participated in a 
scheme for euthanasia, in circumstances where the convicted person was a substantial beneficiary 
under the will of the deceased person. In the other recent case, Shirley Justins was initially convicted 
of manslaughter for assisting her former de facto partner, former pilot Graeme Wiley, to commit 
suicide,2 although the conviction was eventually overturned.3 Justins then plead guilty to assisting 
suicide and the Crown accepted the plea.4 Both cases involved the importation and administration of 
the euthanasia drug Nembutal or Pentobarbital.  
 Voluntary euthanasia is legal in some overseas jurisdictions such as Switzerland, Holland, 
Belgium and Luxemburg. In 1997, legislation to legalise euthanasia in limited circumstances was 
enacted in the Northern Territory,5 although this was repealed after only nine months’ operation. 
Recently the British Columbia High Court ruled that provisions of the Canada’s Criminal Code that 
forbid doctor-assisted suicide unjustly violate constitutional rights to life, liberty and equality.6 
However, in Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381 (Admin) the English High Court 
recently declined to change the law concerning assisted suicide and euthanasia, which is broadly in 
accord with the current Australian legal position. The court concluded that changes in this area of law 
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1 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29. 
2 R v Shirley Justins [2008] NSWSC 1194. 
3 Justins v The Queen (2010) 79 NSWLR 544; [2010] NSWCCA 242. 
4 R v Justins [2011] NSWSC 568. 
5 Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1997.  
6 Canadian Press, “B.C. Supreme Court Strikes Down Assisted-Suicide Ban”, National Post (15 June 2012) available at 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/06/15/b-c-supreme-court-strikes-down-assisted-suicide-ban-as-unconstitutional/ viewed 6 
February 2013. 
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could only be made by Parliament, representing society as a whole, with “the most carefully 
structured safeguards which only Parliament can deliver”.7 For the court to act to alter the common 
law in this area would be to usurp the role of the legislature, as “major changes involving matters of 
controversial social policy are for Parliament”.8 In particular the court declined to find that the 
Director of Public Prosecutions had a legal duty to provide further clarification on his policy for 
prosecution of persons who aided a suicide. 
 It would seem that there is support in certain sections of the Australian community for legalised 
euthanasia under controlled conditions. For example, it has been reported that former Brisbane Lord 
Mayor Clem Jones left a bequest of $5 million in his will to fund a campaign for the legalisation of 
euthanasia in memory of his late wife who he cared for while she suffered from cancer in the years 
preceding her death.9 Such support for legalised euthanasia suggests that similar cases may arise 
again. 
<DIV>NIELSEN  
In the Nielsen case, Merin Nielsen was convicted of aiding the suicide of Frank Ward. The deceased 
was a widower aged 76, who had emigrated to Australia to marry. He had no relatives of his own, 
though his wife had relatives in Canberra. He had nursed his wife as sole carer over a 20-year period 
while she had multiple sclerosis, and had expressed a firm desire to himself avoid a prolonged illness 
or incapacity. Although the evidence was that Mr Ward was an isolated man in his old age, in her 
sentencing remarks, Dalton J concluded:  
<blockquote> 
I don’t accept that he was lonely or vulnerable because of his isolation. Witnesses described him as stubborn 
and cantankerous. He certainly knew his own mind, and there is no question that he had full capacity at all 
relevant times.10 
</blockquote> 
 Mr Nielsen met Mr Ward in about 1980/1981 when he joined a meditation group attended by Mr 
Ward. After Mr Ward suffered a minor stroke on 11 July 2007, the relationship between Mr Ward and 
Mr Nielsen increased. Dalton J found:  
<blockquote> 
He asked you for help and you gave it. He trusted you. He made you his Power of Attorney on 25 July 2007, 
and he made you the sole beneficiary of a will dated the 5th of August 2007... At the same time, July 2007, 
as Mr Ward had his stroke, made you his Power of Attorney and made you his beneficiary, you contacted 
Exit International, a pro-euthanasia group on Frank Ward’s behalf.11 
</blockquote> 
 During the period following Mr Ward’s stroke, Mr Nielsen assisted him with shopping and 
banking, thus gaining some “idea of his financial state”, although it did not appear that he had “any 
precise idea of his net worth”.12 Following Mr Ward’s recovery from the stroke, contact became less 
frequent. However, Mr Nielsen remained in contact every one or two months, and told police that he 
felt somewhat obliged to continue being friendly to Mr Ward because he was a beneficiary under his 
will.13  
 
7 Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2012 EWHC 2381 (Admin) (Royce J) at [151]. 
8 Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2012 EWHC 2381 (Admin)  at [79]. 
9 “Clem Jones's $5m Last Wish”, Brisbane Times (13 April 2008) available at 
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/news/queensland/clem-joness-5m-last-wish/2008/04/13/1208024954915.html viewed 6 
February 2013. 
10 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29 at 2. 
11 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29  at 5. 
12 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29  at 6. 
13 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29  at 6. 
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 In June 2009 following a request from Mr Ward, Mr Nielsen travelled to Mexico to purchase the 
drug Pentobarbital, which he gave to Mr Ward on 20 June. Mr Ward was found dead later that day 
with a bottle of Pentobarbital next to him, some of its contents in a glass.14 
 Following the death of Mr Ward, Mr Nielsen was charged, found guilty of aiding the suicide and 
sentenced to a term of three years’ imprisonment, with a parole release date following six months in 
custody.15 
<DIV>JUSTINS 
In the Justins case, former Qantas pilot, Graeme Wiley, who had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s 
disease and had twice previously attempted to commit suicide, made a will drawn by a solicitor a 
week before his death. The deceased and his de facto partner Shirley Justins attended on the solicitor 
for the purpose of having his will changed. Under this will he left his $2.4 million estate to Ms 
Justins, and only relatively small legacies to his two daughters. Under his previous will Wiley’s estate 
was divided between Justins and his two daughters (the daughters being entitled to share one half of 
his estate). The daughters commenced proceedings to challenge the will for lack of capacity. It has 
been reported that the new will was held invalid for lack of testamentary capacity and his destruction 
of the earlier will was flawed, although the matter was settled with the parties agreeing to divide the 
estate closer to the terms of the original will.16 The settlement was ratified by the decision of Palmer J 
in May 2009.17 It is not known to what extent the forfeiture rule18 was relevant to the settlement 
terms.19 It seems that forfeiture should have been a relevant factor as Shirley Justins at this time had 
been convicted of manslaughter (the conviction was later overturned20 and her plea of guilty to 
assisting suicide was accepted.21) If the matter was settled along the lines of the earlier will, then it 
appears a forfeiture was not applied and discretion to modify the effect of the rule as justice requires 
was exercised under the Forfeiture Act 1995 (NSW). 
 Naturally there were questions raised about the lawyer taking instructions for a new will when 
Wiley had Alzheimer’s disease and had twice previously attempted to commit suicide. Further 
instructions were taken in the presence of his de facto partner for a will substantially in her favour, 
which changed the former dispositions in favour of his daughters markedly. However, according to a 
press report, the lawyer testified that she believed that her client had capacity and was not subject to 
undue influence.22 She also testified that she had no knowledge that he had Alzheimer’s disease, or 
that he had previously attempted to commit suicide.23 In his sentencing remarks Howie J noted that 
the solicitor was misled by Justins by failing to disclose relevant facts24 and was not made aware of 
Wiley’s mental difficiencies.25 
 In relation to this turn of events, in Nielsen Dalton J commented: 
<blockquote> 
 
14 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29  at 13. 
15 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29  at 26. 
16 Alexander H, “Family of Euthanasia Victim Settle on Estate”, Sydney Morning Herald (19 May 2009) available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/national/family-of-euthanasia-victim-settle-on-estate-20090518-bcp5.html viewed 6 February 2013. 
17 Shirley Justins v Tania Ann Shakespeare (unreported, Sup Ct of NSW, Palmer J, 2006/00277645, 18 May 2009). Authors’ 
note: Despite repeated attempts the authors have been unable to access Palmer J’s decision, which appears to be unreported. 
18 In NSW the court is given a discretion to modify the effect of the forfeiture rule if it is satisfied that justice requires the effect 
of the forfeiture rule to be modified, Forfeiture Act 1995(NSW), s 5. 
19 Shirley Justins v Tania Ann Shakespeare (unreported, Sup Ct of NSW, Palmer J, 2006/00277645, 18 May 2009).  
20 Justins v Regina (2010) 79 NSWLR 544; [2010] NSWCCA 242. 
21 R v Shirley Justins [2011] NSWSC 568. 
22 “Lawyer Unaware of Client’s Dementia Before New Will Drafted”, AAP (21 May 2008).  
23 See n 22.. 
24 R v Justins {2008] NSWSC 1194 at [38]. 
25 R v Justins {2008] NSWSC 1194  at [21]. 
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I find quite disturbing in that case a factor that, very shortly before the assisted suicide, the defendant had a 
solicitor, who didn't know her husband, and who wasn't told of his medical condition, prepare a new will 
under which she benefitted very substantially in relation to a very big estate, an estate worth about $2 
million.26 
</blockquote> 
<DIV>POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ASSISTED SUICIDE: APPLICATION OF 
FORFEITURE RULE, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND/OR UNDUE INFLUENCE? 
In cases such as the Nielsen and Justins cases, where the person aiding a suicide is a principal 
beneficiary under the will of the deceased, various legal consequences may follow which may result 
in loss of such benefit.  
<subdiv>Forfeiture rule 
The forfeiture rule has its origins in a common law principle which provides that where a person is 
criminally responsible for the death of another from whose estate that person will benefit, then the 
person’s interest in that property is forfeited.27 The public policy of the forfeiture rule is that a person 
who has unlawfully killed another person should not be entitled to benefit from his or her victim’s 
estate.28 
 At common law the forfeiture rule has been applied even where the killer has been acquitted of 
murder or manslaughter, as proof of unlawful killing such as to invoke the rule can be on the civil 
standard.29  
 Modern cases have applied the forfeiture rule both flexibly30 and rigidly.31 A flexible 
interpretation has frequently been sought when the perpetrator is a “battered woman” who has killed 
her spouse/partner in circumstances which suggest self-defence. Very often in such cases the woman 
pleads guilty to manslaughter to avoid risking a conviction for murder. A rigid interpretation of the 
rule was adopted by the majority of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Troja v Troja (1994) 33 
NSWLR 269. In that case the forfeiture rule was applied to a battered woman who killed her husband 
in circumstances which arguably amounted to self-defence. Kirby P in dissent viewed the killing as in 
circumstances that were “morally blameless”.  
 The Troja case led to the enactment in New South Wales of the Forfeiture Act,32 which gives the 
court an explicit discretion not to apply the rule where the justice of the case demands a more flexible 
approach. A Forfeiture Act was introduced in the Australian Capital Territory in 1991.33.Both the 
ACT and NSW legislation was modelled on the United Kingdom’s Forfeiture Act 1982. No other 
Australian jurisdictions have followed suit, although in 2004 the Tasmania Law Reform Institute 
recommended legislation along the lines of the New South Wales model.34  
 Section 5 of the Forfeiture Act (NSW) provides:  
<blockquote> 
5 Power of Supreme Court to modify effect of forfeiture rule  
 
26 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29 at 26. 
27 See generally Hemming A, “Killing the Goose and Keeping the Golden Nest Egg” (2008) 8 QUTLJJ 342. 
28 For a discussion of a recent decision relating to the application of the forfeiture rule see: Cockburn T, “Application of 
Forfeiture Rule in Cases of Mental Illness” (2006) 8 (10) Retirement and Estate Planning Bulletin 147. 
29 Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691; Rivers v Rivers (2002) 84 SASR 426. 
30 Public Trustee v Evans (1985) 2 NSWLR 188. 
31 Troja v Troja (1994) 33 NSWLR 269. 
32 Forfeiture Act 1995 (NSW)  
33 Forfeiture Act 1991 (ACT). 
34 Tasmania Law Reform Institute, The Forfeiture Rule, Final Report No 6 (2004) p 18. 
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(1) If a person has unlawfully killed another person and is thereby precluded by the forfeiture rule from 
obtaining a benefit, any interested person may make an application to the Supreme Court for an order 
modifying the effect of the rule.  
(2) On any such application, the Court may make an order modifying the effect of the forfeiture rule if it is 
satisfied that justice requires the effect of the rule to be modified.  
(3) In determining whether justice requires the effect of the rule to be modified, the Court is to have regard 
to the following matters:  
(a) the conduct of the offender,  
(b) the conduct of the deceased person,  
(c) the effect of the application of the rule on the offender or any other person,  
(d) such other matters as appear to the Court to be material.  
</blockquote> 
 Hemming has suggested that these statutes which allow judicial discretion in cases of 
manslaughter based on “the justice of the case” have both skewed the outcome in favour of the killer 
and added unnecessary complexity and uncertainty. He has proposed that the better approach is to 
substitute a uniform national code (Parliament rather than judges being the appropriate body to 
balance the public interest with the interests of individuals) which is designed to achieve greater 
fairness, improve the efficiency of the distribution of justice, provide a comprehensive solution 
involving other relevant legislation and reflect contemporary values within the Australian 
community.35 
 Although in R v Nielsen Dalton J was careful to note that “this case is not about general 
principles or moral views about euthanasia, it is about those facts and the application of the law to 
them”.36 Her Honour made some observations about the issue as to whether a person assisting a 
suicide should be entitled to benefit under a will:  
<blockquote> 
I have found it of some assistance to consider the type of theoretical legal models that are proposed, for 
example, for medically assisted suicide, and the laws in countries where medically assisted suicide is 
possible. There is always provision for independent medical examination by more than one doctor, and there 
would certainly never be a situation allowed by such model or such a law, where the decision was made by 
someone with a financial interest in the decision.37 
</blockquote> 
 When the New South Wales Attorney-General introduced the New South Wales forfeiture 
legislation he specifically referred to certain kinds of cases, which might invite the court not to apply 
a forfeiture, eg when the person who kills is a “battered woman”, or the killing is part of a suicide 
pact.38 In addition, the New Zealand Law Commission’s recommendation for codified forfeiture 
legislation (eliminating judicial discretion as in NSW and the ACT) also contended that a killing as 
part of a suicide pact or assisted suicide should not attract forfeiture.39 So it would seem that there is 
some support for a flexible approach to the application of the forfeiture rule in cases of aiding suicide.  
 That such an approach is warranted has been recently indicated by the sentencing comments of 
Dalton J in Nielsen and the outcome of the charges in Justins. In assisted suicide cases the courts may 
be faced with a range of situations and surrounding circumstances which may be relevant to the 
exercise of discretion as to whether to impose or support the forfeiture. In some cases, like Justins, 
 
35 Hemming,, n 27. 
36 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29 at 17. 
37 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29 at 17. 
38 New South Wales, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates (25 October 1995) p 2257 (Hon JW Shaw) cited in 
Hemming, n 27 at 355, footnote 121. 
39 Hemming, n 27.  
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the killer or assister may be a spouse or a child who aids the suicide of or kills their spouse or parent 
in “circumstances where they have been a long term carer with a clear compassionate and altruistic 
motive for someone in a hopeless and extreme medical situation”.40 Other cases may be closer to the 
facts of Nielsen, where an acquaintance, albeit a long term acquaintance, is the person aiding the 
suicide, in circumstances where the medical situation is not so extreme. Indeed Dalton J contrasted 
the Nielsen situation with such long time carer type cases. Her Honour described the circumstances of 
the relationship between Mr Ward and Mr Nielsen as follows:  
<blockquote> 
you were not under the same sort of emotional pressure as is evident in cases where a husband, or child, or 
wife, assists their spouse or parent to commit suicide. You were not caring for Mr Ward on a day-to-day 
basis. In fact, really, apart from his elderly neighbours popping in to see him twice a day, nobody was caring 
for him because he didn't need that type of care. 
You had had a long relationship with him, but, as I say, it could not be described as a close friendship, and 
you said to the police that you felt obliged to visit him and be friendly to him because he had made you the 
beneficiary under his will.41 
</blockquote> 
 Absent judicial pronouncement or legislative reform which clarifies the position, for so long as 
aiding suicide remains a crime in Australia there remains the possibility that when a person found 
guilty of aiding suicide is a major beneficiary under a will, his or her interest may be liable to 
forfeiture either under the common law and/or statutory forfeiture rules. Where the forfeiture rule is 
held to apply, the wrongdoer may be treated as having predeceased the testator or obliged to hold his 
or her forfeited entitlement pursuant to a constructive trust.42 Where property passes under a will 
which appoints the wrongdoer executor, the wrongdoer is not entitled to claim the disposition in his 
or her favour and the disposition and/or appointment as executor should be read as if the wrongdoer 
had died immediately before the testator.43 Where property is held jointly, either the unlawful killing 
effects a severance of the joint tenancy or the interest of the deceased passes to the surviving joint 
tenant subject to the imposition of a constructive trust upon the wrongdoer to the extent his or her 
interest is enlarged by the unlawful killing of the joint tenant. The latter approach has been favoured 
by the Queensland courts.44  
<subdiv>Breach of fiduciary duty  
Even if the scope of the forfeiture rule is not considered to include circumstances in which a person 
convicted of assisted suicide (as distinct from manslaughter), in cases such as Nielsen, where the 
person aiding the suicide had been appointed to be the attorney of the deceased, this relationship may 
form the basis for equitable relief such that any benefit obtained under the will of the deceased might 
be disgorged as a remedy for breach of equitable obligation.  
 The relationship between principal and attorney under power is an established category of 
fiduciary relationship.45 It is a general principle of equity that a fiduciary will be held liable to account 
if it is established that he or she has obtained a profit, personal benefit or gain in circumstances where 
 
40 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29 at 21. 
41 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29  at 15-16 
42 For a discussion see Hemming, n 27 at 353-354. 
43 Re Stone [1989] 1 Qd R 351; Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Life Fund Association [1892] 1 QB 147 and Public Trustee v Hayles 
(1993) 33 NSWLR 433. 
44 Re Stone [1989] 1 Qd R 351, followed by Atkinson J in Re Nicholson [2004] QSC 480, Douglas J in State of Queensland v 
Byers [2006] QSC 334 and recently In the Will of Robert Michael Palmer (decd) BS5797/2009 (reasons for judgement not 
given). The authors wish to thank Caite Brewer, Barrister, for information about the decision in In the Will of Robert Michael 
Palmer and for letting them read her submission in this case on behalf of the applicant son (son of the deceased and his wife 
who was convicted of his manslaughter). 
45 McKenzie v McDonald [1927] VLR 134. 
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there existed a conflict of personal interest and fiduciary duty, or a significant possibility of such 
conflict.46 
 In Nielsen, Ward had appointed Nielsen to be his attorney and the primary beneficiary under his 
will. That Nielsen had a financial interest in Frank Ward’s death is indisputable, although this was not 
put as a primary motive for assisting Ward to commit suicide. In her sentencing remarks in R v 
Nielsen Dalton J said:  
<blockquote> 
And, of course, you had a personal financial interest in the death. It is not put as your main motive but I 
don't think this matter can be ignored. It is just not possible in any setting to ignore such a conflict of 
interest. It is also not irrelevant that at the time you had little in the way of personal assets. You had almost 
no money in the bank and a credit card debt, so that your net position was that you were about $12,000 in 
debt.  
In the police interviews you make statements about the will and your interest under it. You make statements 
indicating a willingness to give Mr Ward's brother and sister money and statements indicating that if there 
was any reasonable challenge to your being the beneficiary under the will, you would stand aside and not 
contest it. You make statements, in effect, to the effect that you're not interested in the money, but there is 
no evidence been put before me on sentence that you have in fact disclaimed interest under the will.47  
</blockquote> 
 There is no precedent for setting aside a willed gift for breach of fiduciary duty at the suit of the 
person who would take in the event of the gift not being upheld. However, general equitable principle 
suggests that where a fiduciary obtains a personal benefit by reason of breach of a fiduciary duty, 
such as preferring his or her own personal interest over that of the beneficiary, then an equitable 
remedy will follow. In such cases the appropriate remedy may be equitable compensation48 payable to 
the residuary beneficiaries of the estate of the deceased or those who would take on intestacy, 
supported by an equitable lien,49 provided that it can be established that there is an adequate causal 
connection between the breach of duty and unlawful gain.50Alternatively, an order that any property 
which is the subject matter of the bequest is to be held on constructive trust for the benefit of the 
residuary beneficiaries of the estate of the deceased, or those who would take on an intestacy, is also a 
possibility, particularly where an order of monetary compensation may not be an adequate remedy to 
do justice in the circumstances of the case.51 
<subdiv>Undue influence 
Furthermore, particularly in Queensland, by reason of the statutory presumption of undue influence 
contained in s 87 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), in cases such as Nielsen, where the person 
aiding the suicide and subsequently taking a benefit under the will of the deceased has been appointed 
 
46 Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178 at 198-199 (Deane J, with whom Brennan and Dawson JJ agreed). 
47 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29 at 16-17. See also R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29 at 8:  
<blockquote> 
There is no doubt that through that time, between July 2007 and June 2009, it must have occurred to you that you had a 
financial interest, a personal financial interest, in Mr Ward’s death. And, as I say, that arose because at about the same time as 
you got in contact with Exit International, you became the sole beneficiary of his will. 
</blockquote> 
48 Assessed according to the principles enunciated in Re Dawson; Union Fidelity Trustee Co Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd 
[1966] 2 NSWR 211; (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 399 at 404-406 (Street J). 
49 Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544; 128 ALR 201. 
50 Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165; 180 ALR 249; Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449 at 473; see 
Hamilton B and Cockburn T, “Solicitors Taking Substantial Gifts under Wills: Probate Doctrines, Professional Regulation and 
the Application of Equitable Doctrines” (2008) 2(2) Journal of Equity 117 at 139, footnote 147. 
51 Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544; 128 ALR 201;  Bathurst City Council v PWC Properties Pty Ltd 
(1988) 195 CLR 566. 
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an attorney of the deceased prior to the will being signed, it may be that the gift under the will is 
liable to be set aside on the grounds of undue influence. 
 Section 87 of the Powers of Attorney Act  provides that where a transaction is between a principal 
and an attorney under an enduring power of attorney and/or a relation, business associate or close 
friend of the attorney, a presumption arises in favour of the principal that the principal was induced to 
enter the transaction by the attorney’s undue influence.52 The presumption comes into effect once an 
enduring power of attorney has been signed and has been applied even when the transaction is not 
effected by use of the power of attorney.53 Whether a ‘transaction’ within the meaning of the s 87 
would include a willed gift is an open question. If such a construction of “transaction” was held to 
apply, then a presumption of undue influence would arise, which would cast the onus on the attorney 
to show the willed gift was the product of the testator’s full, free and informed thought. This potential 
equitable basis of challenging the gift would be in addition to traditional probate grounds such as 
undue influence (which requires proof of coercion,54 and is difficult to establish) and lack of 
testamentary capacity.55 
 However, on the basis of the findings in Nielsen, claims to set aside the bequest to Mr Nielsen on 
the grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity might be difficult to establish, given 
Her Honour’s findings that:  
<blockquote> 
I don’t accept that he was lonely or vulnerable because of his isolation. Witnesses described him as stubborn 
and cantankerous. He certainly knew his own mind, and there is no question that he had full capacity at all 
relevant times.56 
</blockquote> 
<DIV>CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The recent criminal law decisions where people have been convicted of aiding suicide raise important 
legal and ethical issues in relation to whether euthanasia should be legalised. These cases also raise 
issues of great significance for succession lawyers. Where, as in cases such as Nielsen and Justins, the 
person convicted of aiding a suicide is a principal beneficiary under the will of the deceased, various 
legal consequences, such as: forfeiture of the interest under the will; liability for breach of fiduciary 
obligation; and/or a finding of undue influence, may follow which may result in loss of such benefit.  
 It remains to be seen, following judicial pronouncement or legislative reform, whether the 
forfeiture rules will be held to apply so that a person convicted of aiding suicide loses his or her 
entitlement under the will of the deceased on the grounds that such intervention is necessary to do 
justice in the circumstances of the case.  
In cases where the person aiding the suicide had been appointed to be the attorney of the deceased, 
this relationship may form the basis for equitable relief (equitable compensation and/or constructive 
trust) for beach of fiduciary duty on the grounds of conflict of interest and duty.  
 Furthermore, particularly in Queensland, by reason of the statutory presumption of undue 
influence contained in s 87 of the Powers of Attorney Act , in cases such as Nielsen, where the person 
aiding the suicide and subsequently taking a benefit under the will of the deceased has been appointed 
an attorney of the deceased, it may be that the gift under the will is liable to be set aside on the 
grounds of undue influence by reason of the statutory presumption that any transaction entered into 
was due to undue influence.  
 
52 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s 87. 
53 Smith v Glegg  (2004) QSC 443 ; discussed in Cockburn T, “Elder Financial Abuse by Attorneys: Relief under Statute and in 
Equity” (2005) June Proctor 22. 
54 Winter v Crichton (1993) 23 NSWLR 116. 
55 Hamilton and Cockburn, n 50. 
56 R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 29 at 2. 
 Assisting a suicide: Potential succession law consequences 
9 
 Given that there remains ongoing community debate as to whether assisted suicide should be 
legalised, there is little doubt that the issues concerning the legal consequences where a person 
convicted of assisting suicide is a beneficiary under the will of the deceased will continue to arise.  
